Michael Dwyer/Associated Press
Virtually all of the reasons to dislike a free-agent signing coalesce in Gordon Hayward’s four-year, $120 million contract with the Charlotte Hornets.
For starters, it runs too long. Hayward is 30, has an alarming injury history and will be paid like a superstar for four years of what should be his decline phase. That’s if he’s healthy and can play enough for diminishing skill to be obvious.
Then there’s the annual rate of pay, which treats Hayward as if he’s the best player on a postseason-bound team or, at the very least, a dominant second option on a contender. You don’t pay someone $30 million per season unless that someone can plausibly carry you to the playoffs on his own or make a meaningful difference for a team that expects to advance several rounds.
Hayward was a borderline superstar four years and several significant injuries ago with the Utah Jazz. With the Boston Celtics, he was a luxury third and fourth option when healthy.
What is he for the Hornets, a team that just drafted a ball-dominant rookie point guard after going 23-42 and probably deserving an even worse record than that?
This is where the true illogic of Hayward’s deal shines through. The Hornets, badly misjudging their status in the league and the playoff picture, did the worst thing a small-market rebuilder could possibly do: They spent recklessly on someone who isn’t good enough to alter that profile.
Having just ended an era defined by Nicolas Batum’s gargantuan and, in terms of its impact on team success, ineffectual contract, you’d think Charlotte would have known not to repeat the same mistake.
Hayward is a good player. Perhaps he’ll look more like the Utah edition of himself in a larger role. But even that version of Hayward won’t be good enough to make Charlotte matter. In the unlikely event everything breaks right, the Hornets almost certainly won’t be better than the East’s top seven teams: the Milwaukee Bucks, Boston Celtics, Miami Heat, Brooklyn Nets, Philadelphia 76ers, Indiana Pacers and Toronto Raptors.
That’s to say nothing of the Atlanta Hawks and Pistons, who both spent big money to get better in the short term; the Orlando Magic, who won 10 more games than the Hornets and made the playoffs last year; and the Washington Wizards, who will get John Wall back and also forked over major cash to stay competitive in the short term.
Rather than use cap space to take on bad money with picks attached, rather than focus on aligning the team’s age band with LaMelo Ball, rather than targeting ideal lottery positioning for the next two loaded drafts, the Hornets spent excessively on a high-risk, declining talent who probably won’t even earn them the eighth seed.
Is there a “one million facepalms” emoji?
Stats courtesy of NBA.com, Basketball Reference and Cleaning the Glass. Salary info via Basketball Insiders.
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